Abstract: Two agents convert resources into safety investment and production while exchanging goods voluntarily. Safety investment ensures reduction of costly risk. High unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort and safety effort, which reduces income.
Recent changes in US accounting laws have made CEOs liable to legal malpractice if accounting information is found to be fraudulent. This has caused a certain panic among firms as to whether they should invest more in information assurance technologies, given that an increase in such investments could lead to a decrease in firms' productivity. Firms, most of which have finite resource constraints, are thus naturally led to determine optimal investments in information assurance technologies versus production technologies. The former can be perceived as investment to reduce the risk of legal malpractice. This article intends to understand the factors that influence the trade-off between safety and productive investment during exchange.
Each agent i can produce one good i, but also attaches utility to another good j, i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j. Agent i has a resource R i (e.g., a capital good, or labour) which can be converted with unit conversion cost a i into productive effort E i , and with unit cost b i into safety effort S i , where
The production cost coefficient a i , where 1/a i is the productive efficiency, measures the resources required to maintain the agent and machinery he uses in production. Analogously, 1/b i is the safety efficiency. As a practical aid, it may be convenient to think of good i as a consumption good such as oil, and the resource R i as a capital good such as oil drilling equipment. Alternatively, the product may be a consumption good such as fish, and the resource R i a capital good such as fishing nets. The productive effort E i is designed to generate good i, i.e., extract income from resources currently employed. Without risk, the production function for good i or income Y i takes the simple form ,
where h is the productivity parameter, with no need for safety effort [Hirshleifer, (1995) 
where c i is a parameter that scales the safety effort relative to the risk r i . A large c i reduces the risk more efficiently. The risk function f(r i , S i ) increases in the risk r i , ∂f / ∂r i > 0, which reduces income, and decreases in the safety effort S i , ∂f / ∂S i <0, which constrains risk. The functional form is chosen for convenient analytical solutions. The agent can invest heavily in safety effort, which reduces the risk considerably, but that also reduces the production due to the budget constraint in (1). Hence, the agent faces a trade-off between E i and S i . Agent 1 exports an amount X 1 of good 1 to agent 2 in exchange for an amount X 2 in return. The agents have equivalent Cobb-Douglas preferences for the two goods, with utilities ( ) ( )
where α is the relative preference parameter for good 1 for both agents, and P 2 is an interior terms-of-exchange price denoting the price of good 2 in terms of good 1. To determine the first order conditions, we let agent 1 choose E 1 and X 1 , and agent 2 choose E 2 and X 2 , simultaneously and independently, to maximise utility. This gives
Proposition 1: The productive effort E i increases in the resource R i and in the risk reduction efficiency c i , and decreases in both unit costs a i and b i , and in the risk r i .
Proposition 2: The safety effort S i increases in the resource R i and risk r i , and decreases in the unit cost b i of safety effort, and in c i .
Proposition 3:
The income Y i increases in the resource R i and in c i , and decreases in both unit costs a i and b i , and in the risk r i .
Especially interesting among these results is that high unit cost of safety effort reduces both productive effort and safety effort, and thus of course reduces income. Focusing on reducing b i is thus beneficial. We next insert 1 2 2 1
into the first equation in (3) and differentiate U 1 with respect to X 1 , and thereafter insert 1 2 2 X P X = into the second equation in (3) and differentiate U 2 with respect to X 2 . This gives
To determine the market equilibrium condition, inserting (5) into (3) gives the price equation (1 )
The price P 2 of good 2 in terms of good 1 is determined endogenously on a supply-demand basis. When agent 1 acquires more resources (R 1 increases), he produces more (Y 1 increases), exports more (X 1 increases), and the price P 2 = X 1 /X 2 increases. Conversely, when the relative preference parameter α for good 1 increases so that both agents attach higher utility to good 1 than to good 2, the demand for good 1 increases, causing a lower price P 2 of the less valuable good 2 in terms of the more valuable good 1.
Inserting (5) 
Essential for the utilities is the agents' preference α for goods. Agent 1 does better if good 1 is more preferred, and conversely if good 2 is preferred.
